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Michael T. Hertz*

Note on Developments
in Torts

I. Introduction
Between October 1974 and March 1975, the Nova Scotia Law News
synopsized some forty Nova Scotia tort cases. This note will not
attempt to duplicate that coverage, but rather to elaborate upon a
few of the points raised in those cases and to emphasize a number of
Supreme Court of Canada decisions which should have tangible
effect upon our provincial tort law.
II. Occupiers' Liability
Veinot v. Kerr-Addison Mines Ltd., 1 was perhaps the most
important and controversial tort case decided in 1974. In it, seven of
the nine Supreme Court justices accepted the modem approach for
dealing with trespassers, as set forth by the House of Lords in
British Railways Board v. Herrington2 . Departing from law
considered settled since 1929,3 the Law Lords had held that no
longer would the duty of an occupier of land be limited to avoiding
injury to a trespasser through "some wilful act involving something
more than the absence of reasonable care." ,4 Rather,
the question whether an occupier is liable in respect of an
accident to a trespasser on his land would depend on whether a
conscientious humane man with his knowledge, skill and
resources could reasonably have been expected to have done or
refrained from doing before the accident something which would
have avoided it. 5

In Veinot, the plaintiff, a snowmobile driver, was injured one night
on defendant company's private road when he hit a pipe, used as a
gate, which stretched across the road at face height. In the vicinity
of the road was a hydro right-of-way, heavily used by snowmobiles.
*Michael T. Hertz, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 533; 3 N.R. 94 (S.C.C.).
2. [1972]A.C. 877(H.L.).
3. Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries)v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358 (H.L.).
4. Id. at 365.
5. British Railways Board v. Herrington, [1972] A.C. 877 at 899 (per Lord Reid)
(H.L.).
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Some evidence pointed to past use of the road by snowmobiles 6 and
failure to warn off such users. Prima facie, the plaintiff was a
trespasser, but the Ontario jury found him to be an "implied
licensee." The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal that there was no evidence for finding such a
licence. Two justices would go no further than to say that the jury
had evidence to support their finding. Three others, agreeing on the
licence issue, went on to hold that, even if the plaintiff were
considered a trespasser, the defendant company was nevertheless
liable as it allowed the pipe to continue in existence, even though it
"should have been recognized by it as a covert peril, menacing the
safety of anyone who came upon the road at night on a
snowmobile." ' 7 The three justices emphasized the company's
knowledge of past night snowmobile travel in the area, the ease by
which the road could be reached by snowmobiles, and the ease in
warning of the peril of the pipe. In doing so, they applied and
adopted the Herrington approach.
Four dissenting justices likewise agreed with the method of the
House of Lords, favouring the adoption of "this approach, which
recognizes that, in certain circumstances, the conduct of an occupier
of land may require him to take steps to enable a person who has
entered on his land, without his actual consent, to avoid a danger of
which the occupier is aware.'' 8 The dissenters would have affirmed
the Ontario Court of Appeal decision because the danger from the
pipe was not great and the evidence was insufficient to show that the
company was aware of the presence of trespassing snowmobilers. In
sum, seven justices adopted a version of Herrington and agreed
that, under certain circumstances, the occupier should owe
trespassers a duty of common humanity, 9 a lesser duty than that of
using reasonable care.10 The two groups disagreed as to the
circumstances under which that duty of common humanity would
arise.
6. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 533 at 537; 3 N.R. 94at 107.
7. Id. at 555; 3 N.R. at 103.
8. Id. at 545; 3 N.R. at 117-118.
9. Id. at 555; 3 N.R. at 103 (Dickson J.); id. at 546; 3 N.R. at 118 (Martland
J.)(occupier required to enable trespasser to avoid danger of which former is

aware).
10. Id. at 541; 3 N.R. at 113 (Martland J., dissenting). Accord, The Law
Commission (Gr. Brit.) Working Paper No. 52, Liability for Damage or Injury to
Trespassers and related questions of Occupier's Liability (London, England: The
Law Commission, 1973) at 18. [herein called "Law Commission"].

Note on Developments in Torts 731

The disagreement is traceable to the speeches of the Law Lords in
Herrington. The Lords agreed that the duty of the occupier to the
trespasser did not arise from the status of occupier qua occupier"
but rather from the occupier's ability to foresee the presence of the
2
trespasser on his premises. Lord Reid, applying a subjective test,'
would hold the duty of common humanity to arise if the occupier
"knew before the accident that there was a substantial probability that
14
3
trespassers would come."' In a subsequent Privy Council case,
Lord Reid muddied the waters somewhat, saying on the one hand
that the occupier may have to act where he creates a danger "when
he knows there is a chance that trespassers will come that way and
will not see or realize the danger",' 5 but saying later that the
occupier's duty arises "when he knows facts which show a
substantial chance that trespassers may come there."' 6 This
"substantial chance" test was adopted in Veinot by Martland J. for
the four dissenting justices.' 7 Lord Pearson, on the other hand,
employed an objective test, i 8 holding the occupier to the common
humanity duty "if the presence of the trespasser is known to or
reasonably to be anticipated by the occupier", 19 the position
adopted by Dickson J. for three justices. 20 For the moment,
therefore, Canada knows that occupiers may owe a duty of common
humanity to trespassers but not whether the occupier's duty will
arise in accordance with subjective or objective standards.
The national reaction to the Veinot case has not been entirely
favourable. The Ontario legislature responded by amending The
Motorized Snow Vehicles Act to provide that the occupier of land
would owe no duty of care to either trespassers or licensees riding or
being towed by a snowmobile, other than a duty not to inflict
intentional injury or act in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's
11. Law Commission at 17.
12. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 533 at 549-50; 3 N.R. 94 at 97 (Dickson J.); Law
Commission at 17.
13. [1972] A.C. 877 at 899.
14. Southern PortlandCement Ltd. v. Cooper, [ 1974] A .C. 623 (P.C.) (Aust.).
15. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 533 at 548; 3 N.R. 94 at 121, citing Lord Reid's
statement in Southern PortlandCement Ltd. v. Cooper, [1974] A.C. 623; Dickson
J. cited Lord Reid's exposition, id. at 644, at (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 533 at 551; 3
N.R. 94 at 99.
18. Law Commission at 17.
19. [1972] A.C. 877 at 922.
20. (1975), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 533 at 555; 3 N.R. 94at 103.
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presence. 21 Whether Nova Scotia will take similar steps remains to
22
be seen.
The adoption of Herrington was foreshadowed by an earlier
Supreme Court of Canada case, Mitchell v. C.N.R., 23 reversing a
decision by the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court. 24 A nine year old boy, while walking down an icy footpath
on railroad property, fell down an embankment and under the
wheels of a passing train, losing a leg. Finding the boy
contributorily negligent in using the icy footway while a train was
passing, the Court nonetheless held the railroad fifty percent liable
for failure to warn people off the path in the first place. The court
emphasized how broadly other jurisdictions had viewed the duty
owing by an occupier to children, citing, inter alia, the Herrington
25
case.
Speaking for the majority, Laskin J. (as he then was) also paused
to inter the remains of London Graving Dock Co. v. Horton.2 6
Horton had held that knowledge of a danger by an invitee would
exonerate the occupier invitor from injuries caused by that danger.
Laskin J. cited Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada2 7 as rejecting
Horton.2 8 However, there remained doubts as to whether Campbell
had truly spelled Horton's demise in Canada, because the evidence
in Campbell was actually that the plaintiff had not had full
knowledge of the danger involved. 2 9 Those doubts may perhaps
now be laid to rest. Laskin J. clearly stated that "it is no longer
proper hold that mere knowledge of likely danger is any more
exonerative of a licensor than of an invitor." 30 Although his words
remain dicta with respect to invitors, sciens is obviously finished as
a complete bar to the liability of an occupier. Laskin J.'s statement
21. The Motorized Snow Vehicles Act, S.O. 1974, c. 113, s.19.
22. A private member's bill (Bill No. 21, 2d Sess., 51st General Assembly, N.S.)
which copies s. 19 of The Motorized Snow Vehicles Act.
23. (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 440; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 363 (S.C.C.).
24. (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 131 (S.C., A.D.).
25. (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 440 at 450; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 363 at 379.

26. [1951]A.C. 737 (H.L.).
27. [1964] S.C.R. 85; 43 D.L.R. (2d) 341.
28. (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 440 at 450-1; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 363 at 379-80. Accord, A.
Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) at 381;
A. Linden,A Century of TortLaw in Canada(1967), 45 Can. B. Rev. 831 at 834.
29. See Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1964] S.C.R. 85 at 94; 43 D.L.R.
(2d) 341 at 349; City ofBrandon v. Farley, [1968] S.C.R. 150 at 156; 66 D.L.R.

(2d) 289 at 294.
30. (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 440 at 450; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 363 at 379.
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clarifies the question of the occupier's duty with respect to dangers
known to his invitee. Unfortunately, the statement also has
suddenly introduced uncertainty into the matter of the occupier's
duty to his licensee, because it seems to impose upon occupiers a
duty to licensees for dangers known to the latter. Traditionally, the
occupier has only had the duty to warn licensees of "concealed
dangers" or "traps" of which the occupier had knowledge. 3' A
danger, though, can hardly be considered "concealed" if it is
known to the licensee, and the cases have exonerated the occupier
from liability where the licensee knew of the danger3 2 or where any
danger apparent to the occupier would be quite as apparent to the
33

visitor.
In Mitchell, however, Laskin J. clearly stated that, since the

plaintiff was in an area where he had tacit permission to be, "no
question of trap . . ." arose. 3 4 For him, the finding of the trial

judge that there was no trap or allurement was inconsequential
because neither of the courts below had considered the condition of
the pathway upon which the plaintiff had slipped. However, under
the traditional view, that "consideration of the pathway" would

have to result in a finding that the ice constituted a "concealed
danger" in order for the occupier to be held liable.3 5 But Laskin J.
31. See, e.g., Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358 at
364 (H.L.). Lord Hailsham's classic exposition has been faulted for his assertion
that a licensor will owe a duty to a licensee with respect to concealed dangers of
which he ought to know, as well as what he actually knows. See, e.g., Hanson v.
City of Saint John, [1974] S.C.R. 354 at 364, 373; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 417 at 423,431.
But four of the five justices in Hanson quite clearly accepted the need for a
"concealed danger", and the fifth did not touch on the matter. Id. at 364, 373; 39
D.L.R. at 423, 430. The matter was well settled prior to Hanson. Hambourg v. T.
Eaton Co., [1935] S.C.R. 440 at 450; [1935] 3 D.L.R. 305 at 313; Greisman v.
Gillingham, [1934] S.C.R. 375 at 384; [1934] 3 D.L.R. 472 at 479; Van
Oudenhove v. D'Aoust (1969), 70 W.W.R. 177 at 190; 8 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 157
(Alta. S.C., A.D.); Daneau v. Trynor Construction Co. (1971), 7 N.S.R. (2d) 207
(S.C., T.D.). See generally J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed. Australia:
Law Book Co., 1971) at 397.
32. See, e.g., Summers v. Niagara Parks Commission, [1945] O.W.N. 329 at
332; [1945] 2 D.L.R. 689 at 694-695 (H.C.), affd on other grounds, [1945]
O.W.N. 817; [1946]1 D.L.R. 34(C.A.);Baker v. Vandepitte (1944), 6B.C.R. 44

(S.C.).
33. Hambourg v. T. Eaton Co., [1935] S.C.R. 440 at 450; [1935]3 D.L.R. 305 at
313.
34. (1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 440 at 449; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 363 at 378.
35. The dissenters in Mitchell, Pigeon and Ritchie JJ., found no duty had been
breached by the defendant railroad as the danger was "obvious" to the plaintiff.
(1974), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 440 At 453 (Pigeon J.), at 457-458 (Ritchie J.); 46 D.L.R.
(3d) 363 at 365 (Ritchie J.), at 370 (Pigeon J.).
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merely remanded the case for consideration of damages and
apportionment of fault, the licensee's awareness of the icy condition
of the path being one element of that apportionment. 3 6 This
approach, if adhered to in succeeding cases, could revolutionize
occupiers' liability law, bringing it into the realm of modern
negligence law and beyond the rigidities of the traditional categories
37
and their trappings.
In Rafuse v. Lunenburg County Exhibition Association, 38 Cowan
C.J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Trial Division, was
presented with a classic occupiers' liability case involving an
invitee. The plaintiff had participated for a prize in a cross-cut
sawing competition held by the defendant. The competition was
held on a stage at the South Shore Exhibition, Bridgewater. After
competing in the competition, the plaintiff went back and leaned
against the stage rail to watch the rest of the competition and wait
for the mixed competition, in which he was entered with his wife.
The rail gave way and the plaintiff fell and was injured. It was
discovered that the wood in one of the posts was rotten and had
broken off. There were no warnings against leaning on that or any
other part of the railing.
Finding that it was customary for the contestants to lean on the
railing and that there were no chairs provided for them, Cowan C. J.
held that the railing constituted an "unusual danger", which he
defined as "such danger as is not usually found in carrying out the
function which the invitee has in hand." 39 The "function" was that
of
being in and about the stage occupied by the defendant for some
considerable period of time, after taking part in one or more
competitions . . . . . being expected to remain on the stage with
a number of other people and with no seats or benches provided,
rest for short periods
upon which those on the stage could
0
between times of actual competition. 4
The defendant ought to have known of the danger, as it was one
36. Id. at 450; 56D.L.R. at 380.
37. Mitchell has been hailed as establishing "an orderly confluence of the streams
of modem negligence principles with occupiers' liability law." Lynch v. Brewers'
Warehousing Co. (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 157 at 161; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 677 at 681 (Ont.
Cty. Ct.).
38. (1974), unrep. S.B.W. 0042 (Oct. 31, 1974, N.S.S.C., T.D., Cowan
C.J.T.D.).
39. Id. at 10, citing Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1964] S.C.R. 85; 43
D.L.R. (2d) 341.
40. Id. at 11.
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which "was discoverable by the exercise of reasonable care and
skill"; and, finally, the defendant had not used reasonable care to
prevent damage to the plaintiff, who had used reasonable care for
his own safety.
III. Nuisance: The Flow of Surface Water
In Loring v. Brightwood Golf and Country Club,4 1 the Appeal
Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court had occasion to deal
definitively with a common problem of surface water run-off. The
plaintiff's land abutted on the defendant's golf course. The natural
contours of the golf course resulted in large amounts of surface
water flowing towards the plaintiff's land during heavy rainstorms.
The plaintiff's land, however, was protected in part by a stone wall
which had existed for some forty years on defendant's property.
Brightwood employees removed the stone wall, and, in a heavy
storm, water flowing from the golf course flooded plaintiff's
basement. Although the defendants had done nothing to increase the
flow of water, by removing the wall they had removed protection
which their neighbour had previously enjoyed. For this act, the
Appeal Division found liability.
The court found that the water did not flow in a watercourse, as it
did not flow in a closely defined channel, 42 and consequently had to
be considered as surface water. Reviewing the law, the court stated
that Nova Scotia, as does the rest of common law Canada, 43 follows
the so-called "common enemy" rule with respect to surface water.
This rule, according to the court, "treats surface water as a
'common enemy' which each owner may fight off or control as he
wills or is able to barring off, retaining, or diverting water." 4 In
contrast, under civil law rules, the lower owner may not bar off the
flow of water coming from upper lands. Each rule, however,
appears to prevent the upper landowner from increasing the burden
which the lower one would naturally have. 45 Under the common
41. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 431; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (S.C., A.D.), reversing in

part, (1972), 7 N.S.R. (2d) 501 (S.C., T.D.).
42. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 431 at 443-4; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 171-2.

43. Alberta may be an exception. See A. Reid, "Surface Water at Common Law"
in G.V. La Forest, ed., Water Law in Canada- The Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1973) at 383.
44. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 431 at 445; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 173.
45. Compare Les Ecclesiastiques du Seminaire des Missions Etrang~resv. Kieffer
(1902), 11 Que. K.B. 173, reversing (1898), 14 Que. S.C. 325 (civil law rule),
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law rule, "[g]enerally speaking the upper proprietor may dispose of
the surface water upon his lands as he may see fit, but he cannot
• . . collect it

. .

. and cast it in a body upon the proprietor below

him to his injury." 46 The Loring court pointed out that the common
law rule prohibiting diversion of water into neighbouring land is one
which seems to be derived from "cases where the upper landowner
collected or accumulated surface water in substantial quantity and
permitted it to escape or diverted it by artificial channels or barriers
to flow on the neighbour's land." 47 The court viewed the facts
48
before it as presenting such a case.
The Loring case is of interest because it did not involve the
collection of water but the destruction of an artificial barrier which
removed an impediment to the natural flow of the water. The
Appeal Division reasoned that the plaintiffs "may well have
acquired prescriptive rights to have the wall continue under s.31 of
the Statute of Limitations. ' 49 The prescription point is not
mentioned in the judgment below, 50 although it was in the Appeal
Division.
In general, the dominant estate may remove artificial barriers to
the flow of the surface water, 5 ' provided that there is neither
prescriptive right 52 nor the operation of an equitable estoppel.5a The
defendant may not, for instance, suddenly remove a barrier in order
to remove accumulated water from his land and have it flow into his
neighbour's property. 54 On the other hand, again assuming no
prescriptive rights, the dominant owner may remove even natural
barriers to drainage, provided that they are recently formed 55 and
with Ostrom v. Sills (1897), 24 O.A.R. 526, aff d, (1898),

28 S.C.R. 485

(common law rule).
46. Ostrom v. Sills (1897), 24 O.A.R. 526 at 539, affd, (1898), 28 S.C.R. 485.
47.
48.
49.
50.

(1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 431 at 447;44 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 174.
Id. at 449; 44 D.L.R. at 176.
Id. at 439-40; 44 D.L.R. at 168.
Loring and Loring v. Brightwood Golf and Country Club Ltd. (1974), 7

N.S.R. (2d) 501 (S.C., T.D.).
51. Thomas & Evans, Ltd. v. Mid-Rhondda Co-operative Society, Ltd., [1940] 4
All E.R. 357 at 362-63 (C.A.).
52. E.g., Felton v. Simpson (1850), 33 N.C. (11 Ire.) 84 (plaintiff's prescriptive

right against defendant's removal of dam).
53. Canton Iron Co. v. Biwabik-Bessemer Co. (1896), 63 Minn. 367; 65 N.W.

643 (S.C.).
54. Whalley v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. (1884), 13 Q.B.D. 131 (C.A.);
Martin v. Schwertley (1912), 155 Iowa 347; 136 N.W. 218 (S.C.).
55. Taylor v. Frevert(1918), 183 Iowa 799; 166 N.W. 474 (S.C.).
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there is no reliance on the continuation of such a temporary
56
obstruction to the flow.
Loring's case demonstrates that, where prescription exists, the
artificial barrier becomes assimilated to a natural barrier, and may
thereafter be removed only if its removal would not cause surface
water to be cast "as a body" upon lower-lying property.
The Loring case presented a second feature, the applicability of
the rule in Goldman v. Hargrave5 7 to surface water problems. The
gravamen of Loring's claim was not, in fact, the removal of the
wall, although it was upon that basis that the Appeal Division
affirmed in part the judgment below. Rather, the plaintiff had
charged the defendant, Brightwood, with failure to keep certain
drains open and clear. A number of catchbasins had been
constructed by the City of Dartmouth on the country club's
property. 58 City employees kept them clear, although Brightwood
employees also cleared them in the "interest of good relations
with" the golf course's neighbours. 59 The Trial Division had held
on the basis of Goldman v. Hargravethat Brightwood had a duty to
keep the drains cleared and had failed to discharge it. The Appeal
Division rejected that holding.
In Goldman, lightning started a fire in a tree on the defendant's
property, and the defendant cut the tree down and sprayed it with
water. Instead of completely extinguishing the fire, the defendant
left the tree to bum itself out. The fire smouldered for three days and
then spread across the plaintiff's boundary, causing damage. The
Privy Council found for the plaintiff, holding that there was a
general occupier's duty to take reasonable steps to remove hazards
upon his land which threaten his neighbours, irrespective of whether
the origin of the hazard is natural or otherwise.
Goldman has been hailed as a bold forward step overcoming the
notorious reluctance of the common law to impose liability in
negligence on a defendant who remains passively inactive in the
face of a hazard, when a course of affirmative
action
60

save his neighbour from impending harm.

. . .

could

56. Farnell v. Parks (1917), 13 Alta. L.R. 7 at 17; 38 D.L.R. 17 at 21 (S.C.)
(dicta). See also, Qualley v. Day, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 928; 23 Sask. L.R. 425 (C.A.);
A. Reid, "Surface Water at Common Law" in G.V. La Forest, ed., Water Law in
Canada- The Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 380.
57. [196612 All E.R. 989 (P.C.) (Aust.).
58. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 431 at 435; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 163-4.
59. Id. at 436; 44 D.L.R. at 165.
60. Id. at 451;44 D.L.R. at 177-8.
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So saying, the Appeal Division went on to distinguish the case on
two grounds. First, it said, the Goldman defendant was not
completely passive, but rather had assumed a task which he failed to
complete. Thus, the case did not overrule cases "like that of the
classic capable rescuer watching a drowning man, of one who stood
idly by and assumed no legal duty however amoral his action might
be." 6 1 Second, relying upon Professor Fleming's view of
Goldman, 6 2 the court held that "the principle exempting owners
from liability for natural flow of surface water is too well
entrenched in our law to be dislodged or affected by general
statements . . . laid down in quite different circumstances. ' 63 The
court felt that the duty of keeping the catchbasins free might be quite
onerous in areas with heavy winter snow. It elected to leave the
prime responsibility for clearing with the municipal authorities.
It is quite clear that the Appeal Division has made a policy
decision, and that neither of the two points made in support of its
position is totally convincing. First, Brightwood was not completely
passive with respect to the catchbasins. As noted above, it had taken
upon itself to keep the drains clear, raising at least the strong
possibility that Loring relied on the defendant's actions to preserve
his property. Without getting into the complexities of where
non-feasance ends and misfeasance begins, 64 it is fair to suggest
that a practice of clearing drains is somewhat analogous to the
railroad cases, where one undertaking to warn the public of passing
trains has a duty to continue it or else clearly state that he is not
doing so. 65 Second, Professor Fleming's remarks appear to be
directed at situations involving completely natural drainage,
whereas Loring involved artificial drainage. It is true, of course,
that the drains in Loring, when blocked, merely returned the flow of
water to its natural state. Yet it could be argued that the country
club, having adopted the catchbasins for their own purposes,6 6 and
61. Id. See, e.g., Vanvalkenburg v. Northern Navigation Co. (1913), 30 O.L.R.
142; 19 D.L.R. 649 (S.C.).
62. J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed. Australia: Law Book Co., 1971) at 358.
63. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 431 at 452; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 179.
64. See, e.g, W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. St. Paul,

Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1971), s. 56.
65. Compare, e.g. Mercer v. S.E. & C. Ry. Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 549, with Soulsby
v. City ofToronto (1908), 15 O.L.R. 13; 9 O.W.R. 871 (H.C.).
66. See Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callahan, [1940] 3 All E.R. 349 (H.L.), in which

a local authority, without defendants' permission, laid a pipe in a ditch on
defendants' land for carrying off rainwater. Due to poor construction, the pipe
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having tended to them on a regular sort of basis, could not thereafter
allow the status quo suddenly to revert to a "natural" state which
67
had not really existed for an appreciable period of time.
IV. CollateralBenefits

In Zinck v. Anderson, 68 Cowan C. J. reversed his earlier decision in
Wolfe v. Oliver 6 9 concerning collateral benefits and held that no
deductions should be made from a plaintiff's claim for damages by
taking into account payments made to the plaintiff under insurance
and disability policies funded by the plaintiff's employer. Wolfe had
earlier been called into question by a decision of Dubinsky J. in
70

Rigby v. Pearl.
In Wolfe, the plaintiff was covered under disability insurance,
half of the premiums for which were paid by his employer.
Adopting the reasoning of Smith v. CPR7 1 which itself relied upon
English authority, Browning v. War Office, 72 the court had held that
there should be deduction from damages awarded to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff was receiving payment through insurance
tended to clog. The pipe became blocked and, during a heavy rainfall, plaintiffs
adjacent premises were flooded. The occupiers were held responsible because they
had acquired knowledge of the tendency of the pipe to block and had "adopted the
nuisance" by using the pipe for the purpose of allowing water to escape from their
own land, without remedying its defects.
67. Very much in point, but coming prior to the Goldman case, is Thomas &
Evans v. Mid-Rhondda Co-operativeSociety, [1940] 4 All E.R. 357 (C.A.), which
did not find applicable the Sedleigh-Denfield case, note 66, supra. Thomas &
Evans involved an artificial wall on defendants' property, which the defendants had
breached in order to erect a building. A flood which occurred thereafter flooded
defendants', and as a result plaintiffs', lands. It was held that defendants owed no
duty to plaintiffs either to erect or maintain the wall. Compare the Whalley case,
note 54, supra, where the defendants were liable for suddenly breaching their wall
and letting water escape from their property to plaintiffs. The cases are
distinguishable because, in the Whalley case, the defendant intentionally
transferred an injury from himself to the plaintiff. If Thomas & Evans can be
distinguished from Loring, it is because the degree of reliance on the defendants'
activities was probably far greater in the latter case than the former, and the
knowledge of the plaintiffs so much greater in the former case that they could no
longer count on the protection of the wall.
68. (1975), unrep. S.H. 05410 (May 14, 1975, N.S.S.C., T.D., Cowan
C.J.T.D.).
69. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 669 (N.S.S.C., T.D.), rev'd on other grounds,
(1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 313; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 380 (S.C., A.D.).
70. (1973), unrep. S.H. 02591 (March 13, 1974, N.S.S.C., T.D., Dubinsky J.).
71. (1964), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 249; 45 W.W.R. 170 (Sask. Q.B.).
72. [1962] 3 All E.R. 1089 (C.A.), refusing to follow, Payne v. Ry. Executive,
[1951]2 All E.R. 910 (C.A.).
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funded by his employer. Browning, however, had been disapproved
73
by the House of Lords in Parry v. Cleaver.
In Boarelli v. Flannigan,74 the same issue had arisen in Ontario
with respect to welfare payments that a plaintiff received while
unemployed as a result of personal injuries suffered in a motor
accident. At that time, the leading Ontario collateral benefits case
was Menhennet v. Schoenholz, 7 5 which likewise relied wrongly on
Browning, because Parry v. Cleaver had not been brought to the
attention of the court. The court elected to reconsider the Menhennet
decision and then disapproved it. Under Menhennet, payments in
the nature of employee fringe benefits were considered collateral
benefits, whereas employer payments ex gratia were deducted from
plaintiff awards. 76 Under Boarelli, this distinction would be made
no longer. With Zinck and Rigby now decided, the Boarelli rule
77
may be considered likely to be adopted in Nova Scotia.
V. Motor Vehicles
Tort law governing motor vehicles has, by and large, developed
with a thrust towards utilization of insurance to spread the bearing
of risks created by automobiles. Our laws reflect this direction, in
that we are willing to impute the liability of drivers to owners7 8 (the
party most likely to be insured) and shift the burden of proof from
the uninsured pedestrian to the insured motorist. 79 Two recent cases
are worth mentioning in this context.
In Abraham v. Piskorski80 the plaintiff, a woman aged 75, fell
across a tow line between two motor vehicles. The vehicles were
joined by the line because the second defendant had asked his
employee, the first defendant, to tow his car and get the engine
started. The second defendant argued that his vehicle was not
73. [1969] 1 All E.R. 555 (H.L.).
74. [1973] 3 O.R. 69; 36 D.L.R. (3d) 4 (C.A.).
75. [1971] 3 O.R. 355; 20 D.L.R. (3d) 395 (C.A.).
76. [197313 O.R. 69at 81; 36 D.L.R. (3d) 4 at 16.
77. See also Abraham v. Piskorski (1972), unrep. S.H. 01195 (Apr. 25, 1975,
N.S.S.C., T.D., Morrison J.) (sick leave benefits not deductible where plaintiff
benefitted from sick leave but was not entitled to balance of unused sick leave on
termination). See generally, D. Oliver, "The Collateral Benefits Rule Today" in
H.N. Janisch, ed., Recent Developments in Torts and Automobile Insurance
(Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1974) at 53-62.
78. The Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191, s. 221(3) & (4).
79. Id., s. 221(1).
80, (1972), unrep. S.H. 01195 (Apr. 25, 1975, N.S.S.C., T.D., Morrison J.).
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present "upon a highway" under s.221(l) of the Motor Vehicle
Act, because it had not reached the street. If s.221(1) did not apply,
then the burden of proof of negligence would not be lifted from the
plaintiff pedestrian. 8 1 Assuming that the vehicle was on the
sidewalk but had not reached the street, the trial court held that the
82
sidewalk was part of the highway and s.221 (1)applied.
Similar issues involving the geographic application of s.221(1)
have arisen in the past. In Comeau v. Murphy,8 3 for instance, the
plaintiff was not on the highway but was struck by a vehicle which
had careened off the highway and hit him. Section 221(1) was
nevertheless applied. Not so in McQuarrie v. Purkis84 which held
that a lane or driveway through a shopping centre lot was not a
highway.
The trend of the cases seems to be to make a fairly careful
dividing line between mere presence of a motor vehicle upon private
lands, which is not covered by s.221(1), and presence on a public
thoroughfare. The Comeau case demonstrates that the injury which
results need not actually occur on the highway so long as it bears a
connection with the presence of a motor vehicle upon it. The
Abraham case demonstrates that injury through mere presence and
not motion of the motor vehicle is all that is required. In the case,
the car was virtually at a standstill.
By way of contrast, a lacuna appeared in the Motor Vehicle Act
in the case of Russell v. Pope.8 5 Plaintiff was a passenger in an
automobile driven by his son. As the car was passing defendant's
parked vehicle, the passenger door of defendant's car opened and
struck the moving vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding.
Plaintiff's son braked and plaintiff was thrown forward and injured.

81. Although s. 22 1(1) is sometimes referred to as the "pedestrian"

section, it is

not limited to pedestrians. Rather, the scope of subsection (1) is limited only by
subsection (2). Thus, for example, in Roy v. Apt (1973), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 110 (Cty.

Ct.), affd, (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 108 (C.A.), it was irrelevant to consider whether
or not the plaintiff bicyclist was a "pedestrian" under s. 1 (ap) of the Motor Vehicle
Act. It was sufficient that a bicycle does not constitute a "motor vehicle" under s.
l(g), defined as "a vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power
82. The Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191, s. l(bl), defines "sidewalk"
as

. . .

. any part of a highway especially set aside for pedestrian travel and

separated from the roadway".
83. (1971), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 674 (S.C., T.D.).

84. (1969), 1 N.S.R. (2d) 317 (S.C., T.D.).
85. (1975), unrep. S.T. 00166 (May 26, 1975, N.S.S.C., T.D., Dubinsky J.).
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The door of defendant's car had been opened by defendant's
sister, a passenger. 86 The action against the defendant, who both
owned and was driving the car, failed. There was not, said the
court, "a scintilla of evidence to indicate that anyone had opened
the door with [defendant's] instructions, thereby making him
vicariously liable for the collision." 8 7 The court held that, in
opening the door of the car, the passenger in defendant's automobile
could not be said to be "operating the motor vehicle"; if she had,
the defendant would have been liable for her actions under s. 321(3)
88
of the Motor Vehicle Act.
The "operation" of a motor vehicle has, in other jurisdictions,
been held to include the opening of a passenger door. 89 So, too,
have such acts as the spraying of chemicals from a motor vehicle 90
and the failure to attach a truck tailgate properly, 9 ' neither of which
is directly connected with actual driving. As one court put it:
We construe the "operating"

. . . of a motor vehicle .. .as

encompassing all acts necessary to be performed in the
movement of a motor vehicle from one place to another or fairly
incident to the ordinary courses of its operation, including

. . .

all

acts which are reasonably connected with entering the vehicle at

the point of departure and alighting therefrom at destination. 92

Obviously, one cannot divorce the terms of the statute from its
raison d'tre. In Schuster v. Whitehead,93 relied on for precedent in
Russell v. Pope, the court distinguished the negligent opening of a
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 4.
88. "A person operating a motor vehicle, other than the owner thereof, shall be
deemed to be the servant and agent of the owner of the motor vehicle and to be
operating the motor vehicle as such servant and agent acting in the course of his
employment and within the scope of his authority as such servant and agent unless
and until the contrary is proved."
89. E.g., Karnes v. Ace Cab Co. (1956), 287 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. C.A.). The cases
have gone both ways. In New York on November 9, 1971, two different judges in
the same New York City court interpreted the same statute and arrived at
diametrically opposite conclusions. Compare Lynton v. Metcalf (1971), 68 Misc.
2d 779; 327 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.) (passenger's opening taxi door was
not "operating" taxi within taxi owner's insurance policy protecting persons
legally operating a motor vehicle in the business of the insured), with Epstein v.
Kernon (1971), 68 Misc. 2d 29; 326 N.Y.S. 2d 137 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.) (contra).
90. Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement District(1959), Cal. App. 2d 7; 335
P.2d 527 (Dist. C.A.) (spraying chemical fog from vehicle caused accident).
91. Orlowski v. Jackson State Prison (1972), 36 Mich. App. 113; 193 N.W. 2d
206 (C.A.).
92. Karnes v. Ace Cab Company (1956), 287 S.W. 2d 378 at 380 (Mo. C.A.).
93. [1960]O.R. 125; 21 D.L.R. (2d) 609 (C.A.).
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car door by the vehicle driver, which it would have held part of the
"operation" of the car, and the same act by a passenger, which it
would not.9 4 In doing so, it underscored its desire not to extend
unduly the principle of vicarious responsibility. 5 Schuster,
however, is bottomed upon the concept that accidents are caused by
individuals, with the corollary that one individual should not be held
liable for the acts of another unless he can be said to have caused
them. The modem trend is to look not so much at individuals as at
activities, such as automobile driving, which create hazards. In that
light, the hazard of a door being negligently opened by the driver is
really no different than the hazard of a door being negligently
opened by a passenger. Both are imputable to the driving activity,
which is a highly insured activity, and should be considered a part
of the operation of the vehicle.
94. Id. at 130; 21 D.L.R. at 613,
95. Id. at 132; 21 D.L.R. at 615.

